An Empirical Model of Factor Adjustment Dynamics by Contreras, Juan
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
An Empirical Model of Factor
Adjustment Dynamics
Juan Contreras
Congressional Budget Office
November 2006
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/9797/
MPRA Paper No. 9797, posted 4. August 2008 06:00 UTC
  
 
Working Paper Series 
Congressional Budget Office 
Washington, D.C. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
AN EMPIRICAL MODEL OF FACTOR ADJUSTMENT DYNAMICS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Juan M. Contreras 
Macroeconomic Analysis Division 
Congressional Budget Office 
Washington, D.C. 
E-mail: juan.contreras@cbo.gov 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
November 2006 
2006-13 
 
 
 
 
Working papers in this series are preliminary and are circulated to stimulate discussion 
and critical comment. These papers are not subject to CBO’s formal review and editing 
processes. The analysis and conclusions expressed in them are those of the authors and 
should not be interpreted as those of the Congressional Budget Office. References in 
publications should be cleared with the authors. Papers in this series can be obtained at 
http://www.cbo.gov/publications/. 
An Empirical Model of Factor Adjustment Dynamics
Juan M. Contreras1
Congressional Budget Office
November 10, 2006
Abstract
This paper investigates how firms dynamically adjust their use of capital, la-
bor, energy, and materials when there are both smooth and lumpy adjustment
possibilities and interrelation among adjustments. The Colombian Annual Census
of Manufacturing provides evidence of these kinds of adjustment. The innovation
of this paper lies in three areas: in considering the joint adjustment and interre-
lation of labor and capital at the establishment level; in describing the dynamic
adjustment of all the production factors; and in a rich description of adjustment
costs, which includes disruption of the production process and reallocation of in-
ternal resources, and fixed costs of installing capital and creating or discontinuing
a job vacancy. The model also includes both a convex cost component, aimed at
capturing smooth adjustments, and congestion effects, which means that it is more
costly for firms to adjust capital and labor at the same time than it is to adjust
them separately. Using a simulated method of moments, the study finds empirical
support for the existence of disruption costs for capital and labor, the existence of
convex costs for capital but not for labor, and the existence of congestion effects.
An important implication of the model is that, in response to shocks, firms decide
to adjust either capital or labor alone or both, depending on the initial capital to
labor ratio and the magnitude of the shocks.
JEL CODES: E22, E24, J23, D24, L60
KeyWords: Factor adjustment, capital and employment adjustment, simulated method
of moments, capital and employment interaction adjustment costs.
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1 Introduction
It was not until a decade ago, with the availability of new firm-level data sets, that
lumpiness and infrequent adjustment in capital and labor2 could be observed in firms’
behavior; this was in stark contrast to the smooth adjustment shown in aggregate data
for those factors.3 At the same time, models attempting to explain the aggregate behav-
ior of these variables had to be revised to account for the microeconomic facts if models
with micro foundations were to be useful in terms of policy and predictions at the firm
and aggregate levels. However, previous studies of adjustment have tended to analyze
one factor at a time, which has made it difficult to understand the joint adjustment of
capital and labor at the micro level and its macroeconomic implications.
Looking for a better understanding of firms’ factor adjustment behavior, this paper
analyzes to what extent it is important to consider joint capital and labor decisions
at the firm level from an empirical and theoretical point of view. Specifically, it asks
whether firms adjust labor independently of capital, if there exist interactions in this
adjustment, and what the nature of such interrelations is. Even if these questions are
not new, there is no satisfactory explanation of the interrelation between capital and
labor adjustments at the firm level and none of the previous models have been able to
explain the factor adjustment dynamic patterns, in part because the existence of this
type of empirical evidence is very recent and not complete for all the production factors,
and in part because of the difficulty in the analysis and estimation of such a model
(analytically or numerically). In this paper, although capital and labor movements are
the main focus, I also incorporate materials and energy adjustments in the analysis.
The implicit view in the early investment4 and labor demand literature was that
profit-maximizing firms would adjust factor demand constantly in response to shocks
in demand and productivity. It was natural to think that way since the aggregate
2The term labor is used in this paper to indicate the number of workers and is synonymous with
employment.
3In order to clarify terms, lumpiness refers to coexistence of inaction and large adjustments with
little in between; this is the opposite of a smooth adjustment that occurs when the adjustment is done
in a continuous way. The main distinctive feature between them is the existence of long inaction periods
and large adjustments in the case of lumpy adjustments, and the nonexistence of inaction periods in
the case of smooth adjustments; note, however, that one might observe large and smooth adjustments
at the same time.
4See Hall and Jorgenson (1967), Tobin (1969), and Abel (1979), among others.
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series were smooth, and the literature instead focused on issues such as the role of
the cost of capital, the serial correlation in investment, and the aggregate dynamics of
labor demand. Recent firm-level empirical studies have shown, however, that firms do
not adjust as often as they should under convex costs, and when they do adjust, this
response comes often simultaneously from adjustment in several margins. Moreover,
new and emerging evidence, such as that presented in this paper, shows that capital and
labor adjustment distributions have fat tails, a mix of small and large adjustments, and a
mass point around the inaction region, all of which has been taken as evidence of lumpy
adjustment.5 The recent evidence also shows that these adjustments are interrelated.6
Subsequent models of investment and labor demand made efforts to incorporate this
emerging empirical evidence and especially the lumpy and infrequent adjustment.7 An
important point they neglect, however, is that firms adjust not just along one but along
several margins, particularly for capital and labor. The few studies that consider capital
and labor together either do so at an aggregate level, which does not exploit the rich
and heterogeneous adjustment observed at the micro level8, or does not account for the
correlation among adjustments.9 As a consequence, estimated parameters governing the
adjustment of capital and labor in response to shocks may be biased10.
5Davis and Haltiwanger (1992), Davis et al. (1996), Caballero et al. (1995, 1997), and Cooper and
Haltiwanger (2005) have shown the mentioned patterns in the separate analysis of labor and capital
adjustment distributions using micro-level data. Rust (1987) shows the lumpy nature of the adjustment
for a single agent in the case of machine replacement.
6Nadiri and Rosen (1969), using aggregate data, and Sakellaris (2004), Eslava et al. (2004) and
Narazani (2004), using micro data, find that the capital and labor adjustments are interrelated.
7These facts were incorporated in the early theoretical literature as models of infrequent adjustment,
while later models also attempted to reproduce the lumpiness in such adjustments. See for example
Dixit and Pindyck (1994) and Abel and Eberly (1994, 1998) in the case of investment, and Hamermesh
(1989) and Hamermesh and Pfann (1996) in the case of labor. More recent work includes Cooper and
Haltiwanger (2005) and Cooper et al. (2004), who consider also the small and smooth adjustments in
conjunction with episodes of large and infrequent adjustments.
8See Shapiro (1986) and Hall (2004).
9Caballero et al. (1995, 1997), Cooper and Haltiwanger (2005), and Cooper et al. (2004) analyze
capital and labor adjustment in a separate way. Rust (1987) analyzes investment for a single firm. Abel
and Eberly (1998) model capital and labor adjustment but do not take into account the interactions
between them. Rendon (2005) features a model with a simpler adjustment cost structure, to determine
whether liquidity constraints restrict job creation. Bloom (2006) analyze capital and labor decisions
but neither incorporates the interaction among adjustments nor the disruption in productivity, both
crucial features in explaining the input factor movements as proposed in this paper
10The biases arise because the models analyze the response of either capital or labor to shocks,
incorporating all the other factor decisions into the shocks. For example, movements in one factor such
as capital would affect the shock in a labor adjustment model, and the real response of labor to shocks
would be overstated.
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The lack of understanding of factor adjustment at the firm level has important impli-
cations. For example, higher firing costs may affect capital formation. Or a policy aiming
to increase investment may not be as effective as expected if hiring/firing costs are un-
affected or if the elasticity of factor use with respect to its relative price is not properly
estimated. Nonconvexities arising from adjustment costs, understood as infrequent and
lumpy movements resulting from discrete payments or reductions in productivity during
adjustment, may lead to very different industry responses to public policies aimed at job
creation, destruction, or investment. It is necessary to estimate those responses in a con-
sistent and realistic way, not only for the sake of predicting the effects of public policies
but also because the behavior of aggregate investment and job creation and destruction
is directly affected by the microeconomic response of firms to shocks in demand and
technology.
In exploring these issues, this paper uses firm-level data from the Colombian Annual
Manufacturing Census, covering the period 1982 to 1998. This is a unique data set
because it contains firm-level data on the value of production, energy and materials,
prices for each product and each material used, the number of workers and payroll, and
book values of equipment and structures. The existence of firm-level prices opens a wide
range of empirical possibilities;11 in this paper they are useful because they allow the
precise identification of technology and demand shocks and of input factor elasticities and
considerably reduce the measurement error in factor demand due to confusion between
prices and quantities.12
In line with recent studies, the empirical analysis reveals the mix of small and large ad-
justments in the capital and labor adjustment distributions (which also present fat tails
and large inaction periods)and their interrelated nature. Going beyond these studies,
the analysis reveals the adjustment patterns in energy and materials and their relation to
capital and labor adjustments. The picture that emerges is that, in response to shocks,
firms adjust capital and labor in a nontrivial, interrelated way. Firms also adjust energy
and materials when they are hit by demand and technology shocks. This is not surpris-
ing if we think that firms face a profit maximization problem over all inputs. What is
11Like the analysis of price stickiness or the effects of technology shocks in the business cycle.
12Note that while other studies, dealing with different issues, have used a similar Colombian data set,
all but Eslava et al. (2004, 2005) use a shorter period (up to 1991) and do not have price information.
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interesting is the observed dynamics of the adjustment.
The data analysis undergirds the main contribution of this paper, which is to pro-
pose, analyze, and estimate a theoretical model of firm behavior that combines a labor
decision problem with a machine replacement problem along with a rich specification
of adjustment costs. The proposed adjustment cost structure captures key features of
the data such as reductions in output and reallocation of resources during adjustment
(disruption costs), the cost of installing capital and creating or destroying a job vacancy
(fixed costs), and a convex cost component introduced to capture the observed mix of
smooth and lumpy adjustment13.
Another key feature in the model is the presence of interaction effects in the adjust-
ment of capital and labor. Interaction effects are precisely defined as the extra cost or
benefit14 of jointly adjusting capital and labor. If the interaction effect is a cost I call it
a congestion effect, and if it is a benefit I call it a complementarity effect. For example,
the interaction effect may be present as congestion if firms have to train new workers to
operate new machines, thus incurring in an extra cost. Another example of interaction
effects would be if disruption in the production process occurs while incorporating new
workers and machines simultaneously, incurring production losses that may be greater
(congestion) or less (complementarities) than if hiring new workers or making new in-
vestments independently. Take the case of a company expanding an existing plant. The
company has the option of building the additional space, investing in new machines and
hiring and training all the needed workers at the same time; or it has the option of
buying the machines, expand the shift of some existing workers to operate the new ma-
chines and hiring later more workers as needed. If the first option is more expensive than
the second one (due for example, to higher drops in productivity) there is a congestion
effect; otherwise there is a complementarity effect.
The dynamic nature of the optimization problem helps explaining why is that, even if
13An important point not addressed here relates to the current debate about the production factors’
response to technology shocks. Besides the serious identification issues faced in the literature that
tries to estimate technology shocks (see Alexopoulus (2004) and her references), previous work has not
considered the possibility that, while adjusting, firms decrease production, suggesting the presence of
an adjustment cost in productivity shock estimates that may result in misleading conclusions about the
effects of pure technology shocks on factor adjustment.
14The model proposed in this paper does not restrict this effect to be a cost or a benefit. It is the
empirical analysis that determines it as a cost.
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there is a congestion effect in the joint adjustment, firms are willing to pay this cost: if
firms optimally adjust both factors at the same time, they can earn more profits today
and in the future. Firms decide what to adjust comparing the foregone profit due to the
sub-optimal level of capital or labor with the cost of the joint adjustment.
After observing in the data the adjustment patterns for the input factors and setting
up a model with the features mentioned above, the paper goes on exploring if the
decision rules generated by this model are able to produce similar firm behavior. In
this initial stage, the adjustment cost parameters are arbitrarily chosen with ex-ante
plausible values. This part of the paper is the core analytical contribution because it
gives an idea of how labor and capital adjustments interact (or not) at the firm level,
depending on the capital labor ratio a particular firm has.
In a second stage, these adjustment cost parameters are estimated with a minimum
distance algorithm in order to match key moments that comprehensively describe firms’
adjustment patterns in capital and employment. The model that best fits the data
includes the interaction term in the adjustment costs for capital and labor, present as
a congestion effect, which suggests that investment influences hiring decisions in an
important way (and vice versa) because of the extra cost that this joint decision implies.
The congestion effects are key, especially to match the contemporaneous correlation
between capital and labor adjustment. The structural methodology allows me to reject
statistically the existence of fixed costs and to accept the existence of disruption costs
for capital and labor, the existence of convex costs for capital but not for labor and the
existence of congestion effects. Finally, the benchmark model of convex costs, widely
used in the macroeconomic literature, is not able to explain by itself the type of behavior
observed in firms’s investment and employment decisions.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the empirical evidence, which is
descriptive and with minimal structure imposed on the data. Section 3 introduces the
model used to explain the empirical patterns. Section 4 presents the solution method
and analyzes the decision rules emerging from an illustrative parametrization of the
model. Section 5 estimates the parameters governing the joint adjustment of capital
and labor and describes tests of the goodness of fit in the estimated parameters. Section
6 concludes.
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2 Factor Adjustment: Facts from the Microdata
Because the variables of interest are adjustments, I look at the gross investment rate
and at the growth in demand for labor, energy, and materials. I start by showing
the distribution of factor adjustments, then present basic correlations among them and
analyze the conditional probability of inaction or adjustment15 during large adjustment
and inaction episodes.16 Finally, I run a VAR(1) to get a sense of the magnitude of the
dynamic interactions between factor adjustments at the firm level for the whole range
of inputs. These empirical exercises are built around the issue of interest, which is the
interrelation between capital and employment adjustment.17
The distributions show a mix of small and large adjustments of capital and labor
with large inaction periods at the firm level; this has been interpreted in the literature
as lumpy adjustment, but it misses the point that infrequent adjustment periods can
be followed by smooth and small adjustment periods. For materials and energy the
adjustment is more continuous, but they show also a mix of small and large adjustments;
in this sense, their adjustment is not lumpy as that term is used to describe capital and
labor adjustment. This micro evidence is in contrast to the smooth aggregate series that
have been extensively analyzed in the literature. The contemporaneous correlations,
and the analysis of the episodes of large adjustments and inaction, show that these
adjustments indeed have a statistically significant degree of interrelation. The VAR(1)
aims to show that the dynamic interrelation between factor adjustments holds during
15I also carried out additional analyses of labor and capital dynamics during periods of large adjust-
ments. In particular, I used simple correlations among the incidence of the episodes and a variation of
the methodology of Sakellaris (2004) and Letterie et al. (2004) to analyze the interrelated adjustment
between capital, labor, energy, and materials. These analyses confirmed the results in this section,
namely the interrelated adjustment, the mix of small and large adjustments, and a mix of smooth and
lumpy factor adjustments. The results also show evidence of adjustment costs based on the observation
of the decrease in productivity and output after periods of adjustment, especially in the case of capital,
suggesting a cost in terms of forgone profits.
16The criteria used to define inaction and large episodes are discussed later in the paper.
17This section is in the same spirit as other recent work showing evidence on the interrelation between
capital and labor adjustment using micro data. Narazani (2004) focuses on a small subset of large Italian
firms to study capital and labor adjustment. Sakellaris (2004) shows evidence on the interrelation in
factor adjustment in episodes of considerable adjustment in capital and labor for the U.S. Letterie et al.
(2004) analyze this adjustment for Danish firms and Polder and Verick (2004) compare the adjustment
dynamics in Denmark and Germany. Eslava et al. (2004) use the same data set used in this paper and
employ the methodology of Caballero et al. (1995, 1997) to analyze the nonlinear interrelation between
capital and labor adjustment. None of these studies, however, contain the structural approach and
comprehensive analysis that this paper presents.
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all episodes of adjustment.
While the main focus of this paper is the adjustment of capital and labor, I also
consider energy and materials adjustment in order to motivate the assumption below
that these factors are adjusted at no cost. This initial exploration of the facts is the
basis for the factor adjustment model presented later.
2.1 Data
The data come from the Colombian Annual Manufacturing Census (AMS) during the
period 1982-1998. The AMS is an annual unbalanced panel of around 13,000 firms with
more than 10 employees or sales above a certain amount. It contains the values of
production, materials, and energy consumption; physical quantities of energy; prices for
each product and material used; production and nonproduction workers and payroll;
and book values of equipment and structures. I use the panel of pairwise continuing
firms constructed by Eslava et al. (2004), which accounts for a total of 2,167 firms in the
period 1982-1998. I choose to work with a balanced panel because I do not analyze the
effects of firm entry or exit. In this section I describe how the variables were constructed.
For more information about the construction of the variables, see Eslava et al. (2004).
Price-level indices are constructed for output and materials using Tornqvist indices,
which are the weighted average of the growth in prices for all individual products (or
materials) generated (or used) by the plant. The weights are the average of the shares
in the total value of production (or materials used). Formally, the index for each plant
j producing outputs (or using materials) h in year t is: lnPjt = lnPjt−1 + ∆Pjt with
Pj1982 as the base year, ∆Pjt =
∑H
h=1 s¯hjt∆ln(Phjt) as the weighted average of growth
in prices for all products h, and s¯hjt =
shjt+shjt−1
2
as the simple average of the share of
product (material) h in plant j’s total value of production (materials usage).
Quantities of materials and output are constructed by dividing the reported value
by the prices. Energy quantities and number of workers are reported by each plant.
Investment represents gross investment and is generated from the information on fixed
assets reported by the plants. Specifically, gross investment is calculated recursively
with the formula Ijt = K
NF
jt − KNIjt + djt − piAjt where KNFjt − KNIjt is the difference in
the value of the fixed assets reported by plant j at the end and beginning of year t
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and djt − piAjt is the depreciation minus the inflation adjustment reported by plant j at
the end of year t. In the rest of the paper, all the variables are in logs unless otherwise
indicated. The reported growth is the log difference, and the observations are considered
outliers if they are greater than 10 (adjustment of 1,000%) or lower than -1 (adjustment
of -100%). Finally, an observation is defined as the adjustment of firm j in year t.
2.2 Factor Adjustment: Distributions, Correlations, and Dy-
namic Interrelation
Distributions of Factor Adjustments : Table 1 and figure 1 illustrate the distri-
bution of factor adjustments (capital, employment (number of workers), energy, and
materials) for all continuing Colombian plants from 1982 to 1998. I will analyze these
distributions in terms of the frequency, symmetry, and size of the adjustments.
With respect to the size of adjustments, there is no standard definition for large or
small adjustments, but a visual inspection of the capital and labor adjustment distri-
butions shows a combination of small and large values with a mass point around the
inaction region (i.e., zero adjustment). The existence of these mass points around zero
adjustment and the fat tails of the distributions can be interpreted as lumpy adjust-
ment.18 For example, in table 1, the lumpy pattern can be observed in the proportion
of adjustments above 20%, considering this number as a large adjustment, compared to
the proportion of adjustments lower than 1% in absolute value, considering this as the
inaction region; on the other hand, smooth adjustment can be observed in the proportion
of adjustments below 20% and above the inaction region. Materials and energy adjust-
ment distributions are not considered lumpy under this criterion since the percentage
of observations in the inaction region is not very high and the medium-size adjustments
(those between 1% and 20%) represent an important number of observations, meaning
more continuous adjustment.
Perhaps a more standard measure of how many extreme observations are observed
in a distribution is the excess kurtosis. In the case of input factor adjustments, all
distributions have large excess kurtosis, indicating that many observations are far from
18Recall that lumpy adjustment is defined here as the coexistence of inaction and large adjustments
with little in between, and a smooth adjustment is defined as a continuous one; see footnote (3).
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the mean.19 Specifically, even excluding the outliers greater than 2 (adjustment of 200%),
the excess kurtosis measures are large and equal to 7.65, 7.96, 2.2, and 3.85, respectively.
These numbers indicate fat tails in the distributions of adjustment and a clear lumpy
adjustment pattern for capital and labor because of the existence of a mass point around
the inaction region; in the case of materials and energy, as explained above, it indicates
the existence of large adjustments but not of a lumpy pattern as there is no mass point
around the inaction region.
In the capital adjustment distribution, large adjustments may, for example, reflect
large investments in machinery installed in one year or less. The inaction region may be
due to small capital investments or to real inaction periods, like the period it takes to
make the decision to build a plant, or the time a big machine lasts without replacement.
The smooth adjustment in capital can come from continuous medium-size investments
or from continuous investment in a project, like the time it takes to build a plant. For
example, a firm may take 5 years to decide to build a new plant (inaction region) and
start building it (lumpy adjustment) during a 3-year period (smooth adjustment). In
the case of employment, lumpy adjustment may reflect a massive firing period.
Figure 1 shows a very asymmetric investment distribution, with very little negative
investment, suggesting high irreversibility of capital in Colombia. The labor adjustment
distribution is much more symmetric. Putting together those two distributions, we can
conclude that it is easy for firms to reduce employment but not capital, perhaps because
of differences in the adjustment costs involved for each input factor (i.e., the selling price
of capital is lower than the buying price). Materials and energy distributions are also
symmetric, though not as much so as the employment distribution.
Firms often leave capital and employment essentially fixed but adjust materials and
energy more frequently. This is the justification for the assumption in the model that
materials and energy are not subject to adjustment costs. The evidence for Colombia is
in line with the evidence for the U.S. using the Longitudinal Research Database, where
lumpiness in capital and employment is also present together with significant periods of
smooth adjustment. This evidence alone suggests the presence of adjustment costs and,
19The normal distribution has an excess kurtosis of zero. The fatter the tails of a distribution, the
bigger the excess kurtosis.
9
as many others have pointed out, may indicate (S,s) behavior in capital and employment
adjustment.
Summarizing the information observed in the distributions, we conclude that: (i) the
distributions of input factor adjustment have fat tails; (ii) the investment distribution
is asymmetric, showing a large degree of irreversibility, while the labor adjustment dis-
tribution is highly symmetric; (iii) capital and employment adjustments are infrequent
(large mass point around zero adjustment) but materials and labor adjustment are much
more frequent (no mass points around zero); and (iv) small and large values coexist in
the distributions of adjustment for all the factors. Points (i) and (iii) signal the existence
of lumpiness in the adjustment of capital and labor due to non-convex costs in capital
and labor adjustment
Correlations of Factor Adjustments : Table 2 shows the contemporaneous cor-
relations among factor adjustments,20 which are all statistically different from zero and
give a sense that capital and employment adjustment periods are interrelated.
It is worth analyzing the patterns of adjustment during inaction periods, during spike
episodes, and during a combination of both to further explore the correlations among
factor adjustment.21 The question is whether inaction or spikes in one factor increase
the probability that firms adjust the other factor. Equivalently, we could ask if firms
stagger capital and labor adjustments; if they do, we will observe an increase in the
probability of adjustment conditional on inaction in the other factor.
Table 3 explores the probabilities of inaction/spike in one factor conditional on in-
action/spike in the other factor; it shows the results of estimating four different logit
models, one each for investment and employment and for inaction and spikes, where the
dependent variable is the probability of adjustment or inaction in one factor and the
20The correlations are calculated regressing adjustment on time dummies to take out business cycle
effects, and I consider only the residuals, which reflect firm-level shocks. Another interesting possibility
would be to consider the business cycle effects as well, but this is left for future work.
21The inaction and spike episodes are defined as above: less than 1% in absolute value for inaction
and more than 20% in absolute value for the spikes. Even though the definition of inaction and spikes
given here may be somewhat arbitrary and may capture adjustments that are not small or large for
certain types of capital (for example, many firms need small tools important for production that signal
a positive investment but lower than 1% of their capital stock), it is useful to characterize the behavior
of capital and employment around “small” and “large” episodes of adjustment.
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independent variables include the adjustment and inaction22 status in the other factor.
The logit estimation includes controls for firm-specific variables such as total factor pro-
ductivity (TFP) and demand shocks23 and the adjustment of energy and materials. It
is important to control for the shocks because they lessen the chances that the comove-
ment between employment and investment is merely due to an omitted third factor.
Moreover, controlling for the TFP and demand shocks identifies the movements in em-
ployment and capital as dependent not only from shocks but also from other sources, in
this case interpreted later as adjustment costs.
From table 3 it can be observed that the probability of inaction in investment in-
creases if there is inaction in employment. The reverse is also true, but the effect is
not statistically significant. At the same time, the probability of an investment spike
increases if there is an employment spike, and the probability of an employment spike
increases when there is an investment spike. These numbers show that capital and labor
tend to move together. The probability of inaction in employment decreases when there
is an investment spike. The other effects are not statistically significant. All these num-
bers suggest that, on the one hand, when there is a large adjustment in either capital
or employment, it is more likely that firms make large adjustments in both factors; on
the other hand, when firms do not adjust employment, it is more likely that they do not
adjust capital, but when firms do not adjust capital, it does not necessarily mean that
they do not adjust labor.
The analysis in table 3 examines the case of large changes in capital and labor. A
natural question that follows is whether this analysis extends to all adjustments in a
dynamic context. I discuss the basic empirical approach for this problem next.
Factor Adjustment Interrelation: Dynamic Dependence : Table 4 presents
the coefficients of a simple VAR with one lag, to show how firms’ factor adjustments
are dynamically interrelated. The coefficients and their statistical significance are quite
robust to several controls and for year effects.24 Table 4 shows that an increase in labor
demand signals a posterior investment episode (the coefficient of the effect of lagged labor
growth on investment is positive and statistically significant). Moreover, the coefficient
22Both dummies are included at the same time.
23The estimation of these shocks is explained later in the paper in the calibration section.
24Controls include shocks in demand and productivity estimated as explained in section 4.1.
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of lagged investment in the labor equation is negative and significant. F-tests for the
cross coefficients of labor and capital in this VAR with 4 variables and in a simpler
version with just capital and employment were run to verify Granger causality. Both
coefficients are different from zero, which does not give much more information since it
is not conclusive about which one causes the other.
The VAR indicates that the firms use several margins of adjustment in capital, labor,
materials, and energy. Moreover, the diagonal elements (the autocorrelation) for all
factors are negative, suggesting that if firms adjust in one period it is very likely that
either they will not do so the next period or they will adjust in the opposite direction.
The negative autocorrelation in the VAR is a reflection of the patterns from the dis-
tribution of adjustments. Capital is the factor with smaller negative autocorrelation in
adjustment, which may signal inaction in the following period.25 Materials and energy
are the factors with higher negative autocorrelation in adjustment, which may signal
instead free adjustment in the opposite direction the following period.
The empirical evidence presented above shows the infrequent nature and the mix of
smooth and lumpy adjustment in capital and labor, and indicates a dynamic dependence
in these adjustments. Notice that the analysis is carried over the whole population of
firms, and not just for a subset as in most previous studies. In the following section, I
set up a model that aims to explain the patterns observed in the data, in particular the
infrequent and lumpy adjustments and the interrelation among factor adjustments.
3 A Dynamic Model of Firms’ Factor Adjustment
The main features of the model are the presence of convex and nonconvex adjustment
costs in capital and labor (but not in the other factors) and the possibility of mu-
tual interaction effects in the form of congestion (if more costly) or complementarities
(if cheaper) in the adjustment process through different adjustment costs if the firms
25This follows because the distribution show a mass around zero and the negative coefficient signals
inaction or adjustment in the opposite direction. It is worth mention also that the investment rate
autocorrelation coefficient changes sign when controlling for individual firm characteristics through
fixed effects (it is positive when fixed effects are not present, showing a similar coefficient to that of the
simple contemporaneous correlations). This suggests that unobservable characteristics are important
and that the simple autocorrelation observed before in table 2 may be a result of aggregation effects
more than firm-level effects.
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adjust capital and labor independently or at the same time. As stated previously, non-
convexities in the decision problem coming from the adjustment costs cause jumps or
infrequent movements in firms’ factors, and interaction effects are defined as changes in
cost due to joint adjustment.
The driving forces of factor adjustment in the model are technology and demand
shocks, but not factor price shocks; this is assumed for simplicity. Simplicity also leads
me to assume symmetry in the adjustment costs. Another important assumption is
the lack of inventories as an adjustment variable. Factor price effects, symmetry of the
adjustment costs, and inventory adjustments are interesting by themselves and left for
future work. For notation purposes, the subscript it is dropped.
3.1 Basics
Demand and Production Function : There is imperfect competition and firms face a
downward sloping demand curve Qd =
(
P
X
)−ψ
, where X is a stochastic shock to demand,
ψ is the price elasticity of demand, and P is the price level.
The production function incorporates capital, labor, materials, and energy. Capital
and labor are costly to adjust, while materials, energy, and hours26 per worker can
be adjusted at no cost. In this context, hours can be thought of as a form of labor
utilization and, while not explored in the model, energy is likely to be correlated with
capital utilization. The assumption here is that all firms have the same Cobb-Douglas
production function and that elasticities and factor shares do not vary by sector.27 This
function does not represent an aggregate production function but instead the production
function of each firm. If we were to assume heterogeneity in the production function, it
would introduce too much complexity in the problem and a separate analysis would have
to be done for each firm or industry. Since I am interested here in the average behavior
of firms, this functional form seems to be the one that can characterize the greatest
number of firms. Formally, Qs = Bkχ (lh)α eξmν = Akχlα, where χ, α, ξ, and ν are the
input factor elasticities for capital, labor, energy, and materials, A = Beξmνhα, B is a
productivity shock, k is the capital level, l is the stock of workers, h represents hours
26When firms adjust employment instead of hours, it is because of the wage premia for overtime.
27In future work I plan to explore the role of heterogeneity in the elasticities.
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per worker, e is energy consumption and m is the materials level. It is convenient for
notation to cluster the terms for hours, energy, materials and productivity in the term
A, since they are optimally chosen period by period in a static maximization problem
and there are no intertemporal links in their case.
Revenue Function and Profit : Putting together the demand equation and the
production function where Qs = Qd, we get the revenue function:
R (z¯, k, l) = z¯kθˆlµˆ (1)
where z¯ = XA(1−
1
ψ ), θˆ = χ
(
1− 1
ψ
)
, and µˆ = α
(
1− 1
ψ
)
. This type of revenue function
is used in most of the literature because of the lack of firm-level information on prices.
It has a demand component present in the terms X and ψ, making it hard to identify
separate from the technology shock in A, even if estimated at the firm level. For the
Colombian Annual Census of Manufacturing, however, firm-level prices are observed.
In equation (1), firms implicitly account for the effects of their input choices on output
prices when maximizing profit. The availability of firm-level prices allowed Eslava et al.
(2004) to obtain arguably unbiased estimates of the input elasticities and the elasticity
of demand, which I utilize in this paper.
Profit incorporates the cost of all the inputs, including the adjustment cost which will
be defined more formally later in this section. For now, profit is given by Π(z, l−1, l, k, k′) =
zkθlµ − w(l) − C(z, l−1, l, k, k′), where w(l) is the payment to employment, C(•) is the
adjustment cost, z is a term that incorporates technology and demand shocks together
with price shocks in materials and energy. Note that the input factor elasticities are
given by θ = θˆ ∗M and µ = µˆ ∗ N , where M and N are terms that incorporate the
elasticities of materials and energy coming from the static optimal firm choice for hours,
materials and energy.28
28Without this simplifying notation, the complete expression including materials and energy would
be Π¯(•) = z¯kθˆlµˆ − l(w0 +w1hζ)−C (z, l−1, l, k, k′)− pee− pmm. Note the functional form assumed in
the wage equation representing a base payment plus a payment for the hours, where ζ is the hours-wage
elasticity. The main difference in both equations is the term for the shocks, z¯, and the explicitness of
the energy and material prices, pee − pmm. In the main text, the term z captures both the shocks z¯,
and the prices and levels in materials and energy coming from the term pee − pmm. This notation is
possible since the firm solves a static optimization problem in energy and materials every period that
can be characterized in the term z.
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Firms’ Decision Problem :29 Firms determine new employment levels into account
the employment level in the previous period. Newly hired workers become productive
in the same period. However, new investment becomes productive only in the next
period. In this sense there is a “time to build” for capital but not a “time to hire” for
employment30. Firms also choose hours, energy, and materials and can adjust them at
no cost. Formally, the firms’ problem is:31
V (z, k, l−1) = max
k′,l
{
Π(z, l−1, l, k, k′) + β
∫
V (z′, k′, l)f(z′/z)dz′
}
= max
k′,l
{zkθlµ − w(l)− C(z, l−1, l, k, k′)
+β
∫
V (z′, k′, l)f(z′/z)dz′} (2)
where (′) means next period value. The investment is implicitly defined in this equation
and given by I = k′ − (1− δ) k, where δ represents depreciation. C(•) is the cost
of adjustment, which takes different parameter values depending on whether the firm
adjusts employment, capital, or both. β is the discount factor, and the integral term
represents the expected value of the firm subject to shocks z which include demand and
technology shocks (which I assume are independent).32
The cost of adjustment C(•) potentially includes disruption costs, fixed costs, and
convex costs. The existence of a disruption cost taking the form of lower productivity
in adjustment periods is justified by the findings of Contreras (2006), Power (1998) and
Sakellaris (2004). The disruption cost can also be associated with the stochastic adjust-
ment cost seen in Caballero and Engel (1999), and may be caused by the reallocation of
resources while adjusting.
The convex cost term does not have a clear micro foundation but has been assumed
29The model proposed is similar in several dimensions to the ones used by Abel and Eberly (1998),
Cooper et al. (1999), Cooper and Haltiwanger (2005), and Cooper et al. (2004).
30This reflects that it is easier for firms to adjust employment, while adjusting capital may take more
planing time (for example to buy and install a new machine or build a plant).
31The notation implicitly states that firms optimally choose energy, materials and hours in a static
maximization problem. These values are embedded in the term z.
32This assumption would not hold if the productivity shocks were not idiosyncratic but instead
common, and TFP would be correlated with demand. Since the estimations of the shocks in this
paper take out the aggregate effects, this effect is mitigated. This assumption has been used before by
Syverson (2005) to estimate production functions and in the recent discussion about the relevance of
VAR to business cycle analysis.
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to exist in previous literature because of the smooth adjustment observed at the macro
level. The distributions shown in section 2 also present regions of smooth and lumpy
adjustments as discussed previously. One of the main advantages of the modeling mech-
anism used in this paper is the ability to identify the importance of such a cost at the
firm level. The fixed adjustment cost can be seen as representing installation costs (in
both time and resources) in the case of capital and firing and hiring costs in the case of
labor.33
Specifically, the functional form assumed for the adjustment costs when firms adjust
l (labor), k (capital), or lk (labor and capital), is the following:
C (z, k, I, l, l−1) =

C l = λlR(•) + Fll−1 + γl2
(
∆l
l−1
)2
l−1 if ∆l 6= 0
Ck = λkR(•) + Fkk + γk2
(
I
k
)2
k + pI ∗ I if I 6= 0
Ckl = C l + Ck + λklR(•) + Fkl
√
l−1k
+γkl
2
(
I
k
) (
∆l
l−1
)√
l−1k if ∆l ∗ I 6= 0
(3)
If the firm adjust either capital or labor (at a cost Ck and C l respectively) the first term
in the cost equations, λjR(•), represents the disruption cost, the second term involving
Fj represents the fixed cost and the third term involving γj represents the convex cost,
where j = k(capital) or l(labor). In the case of capital adjustment, there is an extra
cost that represents the investment price and it can take values of pI = {pbuy, psell}
depending on whether the firm buys or sells capital. The asymmetry in the price for
buying and selling capital implies that capital is not fully reversible, which, as noted
above, is consistent with the observed distribution of capital adjustments.
If the firm adjusts capital and employment at the same time, the adjustment cost
is the sum of the cost of adjusting capital (Ck) plus the cost of adjusting employment
independently (C l) plus a collection of terms that represent the extra cost of the joint
adjustment. This means that the cost function for joint capital and employment adjust-
ment is assumed to have the form Ckl = Ck +C l +Cjoint adjustment. The parameters are
then {λk, λl, λkl} for the disruption cost, {Fk, Fl, Fkl} for the fixed cost, {γk, γl, γkl} for
the convex cost and pI for the investment price. If interaction effects exist, the terms in
33The setup of the adjustment cost model will allow the estimation procedure below to distinguish
which component is more important in the factor adjustment process.
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(3) reflecting joint adjustment (λkl,γkl and Fkl) will be different from zero. This inter-
action will be in the form of a congestion effect if the cost is positive (a loss) or in the
form of a complementarity if the cost is negative (a benefit).
Intuitively, interaction effects in the disruption cost mean that forgone profits due
to interruption in the production process, or decreases in productivity while adjusting
capital and labor, may be higher (congestion) or lower (complementarities) than when
adjusting only one factor. For example, the learning process for new workers operating
new machines may induce a congestion effect because it is more expensive than the cost
of training new workers and of buying new machines separately. Congestion effects in
the fixed cost may be due to higher installation costs for workers specific to certain
machines, and congestion effects in the convex costs may be due to a longer adjustment
period in the plants.
3.2 Analysis of the Model
The economics of joint adjustment can be summarized as “adjust if the marginal ben-
efit is bigger than the marginal cost of adjustment.” In this sense, the relative values
of the adjustment costs play a key role, since they determine which factor to adjust.
The subsections that follow will highlight the main differences between this model and
the conventional models, and the new implications of considering joint adjustment of
capital and labor when they are costly to adjust and there is an interrelation in their
adjustment.34
Case 1. No Adjustment Costs
In this case, the firm faces a static optimization problem for capital and labor, as
well as for energy and materials. This problem is captured by the term z in the case of
energy and materials. The first-order conditions (FOCs)35 are:
k′ : β
∫
Vk′ (z
′, k′, l) f (z′|z) dz′ = pI (4)
l : µzkθlµ−1 = wl(l) (5)
34The analysis will consider that firms have already optimally chosen hours, energy, and materials as
a function of the state space composed of the shocks in demand and technology, the capital stock, and
number of workers.
35The FOCs for labor, energy, materials, and hours under the full specification of the model (i.e.,
opening up the term z) can be derived as well using the profit function in footnote (28).
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Without adjustment costs, shocks directly affect capital and employment decisions and
the correlation among all is high every time a shock is realized. It is clear that in order
to reproduce the main features of the data some nominal or real rigidity is needed. The
initial candidate in the literature was the convex cost component, later adding nonconvex
costs to account for inaction and lumpiness. This topic is analyzed next.
Case 2. Adjustment Costs for Capital and Employment
If firms face any type of adjustment costs, the analysis changes. The FOCs and
envelope conditions of the problem in the general case are:
k′ : Ck′(z, l−1, l, k, k′) + β
∫
Vk′
(
z′, k′, l
)
f
(
z′|z) dz′ ≤ 0 (6)
l : µzkθlµ−1 − wl(l)− Cl(z, l−1, l, k, k′) + β
∫
Vl
(
z′, k′, l
)
f
(
z′|z) dz′ ≤ 0 (7)
Cl−1(z, l−1, l, k, k
′)− Vl−1 (z, k, l−1) ≤ 0 (8)
θzkθ−1lµ + (1− δ) ∗ Ck′(z, l−1, l, k, k′)− Ck(z, l−1, l, k, k′)− Vk (z, k, l−1) ≤ 0 (9)
These FOCs and envelope conditions reveal that the functional form of the adjustment
costs is crucial to understanding firms’ factor adjustment. These expressions are in-
equality conditions because of the possibility of corner solutions. Equations (6), (7), (8),
and (9) hold with equality only when the adjustment in both factors is nonzero. The
firm adjusts one factor if the net gain of adjustment is higher than if it adjusts the other
factor or both employment and capital together. This opens the possibility of staggered
adjustment, even if the adjustment cost is convex: in previous models, convex adjust-
ment costs imply continuous adjustment. Another point to notice is that the discounted
marginal value of labor adjustment depends on investment, and the discounted marginal
value of investment depends on labor adjustment, whenever firms decide to adjust both
factors or whenever the adjustment cost reflects interaction effects.
Convex Adjustment Costs : Equation (6) is the general case of Tobin’s q, obtained
with a quadratic functional form considering only capital. If firms face convex costs in
both factors, given the inequalities in the FOC and depending on the parameter values
and the functional forms, there is a possibility of inaction if adjusting one factor gives a
higher net marginal benefit than adjusting both factors at the same time. If equations
(6) and (7) hold with equality (i.e., when adjustment is nonzero in both factors), an
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interesting result can be seen, assuming a convex cost only for the interrelation term:
γkl(l − l−1)
(
I
k
)
. Updating (8) and plugging the result into (7), we find:
E
(
I ′
k′
)
=
1
βγkl
{
w0 + γkl
(
I
k
)
− µzkθlµ−1
}
(10)
From (10) we can see that investment rates are positively correlated in time, which is a
common feature of convex cost models of investment. Moreover, since µ < 1, it can be
shown that the investment rate in period t + 1 is positively correlated with the change
in labor in period t.
Convex and Nonconvex Adjustment Costs : When hit by a demand or pro-
ductivity shock, firms decide whether to adjust capital, labor, or both, and at the same
time decides the optimal level of materials, energy, and hours.36 The firms’ problem is
given by (2) and the optimality conditions for capital and labor are given by equations
(6), (7), (8), and (9). If we define V k as the value of adjusting only capital, V l as the
value of adjusting only labor, V kl as the value of adjusting both capital and labor, and
V n as the value of nonadjustment, we can redefine the problem as a continuous choice
problem nested in a discrete choice framework. Given the firms’ decision problem in
(2), we can express it as V (•) = max[V N , V K , V L, V LK ], where firms choose the action
that gives them the highest V . That is: (i) firms do not adjust if V n > [V k, V l, V kl]; (ii)
firms adjust labor if V l > [V n, V k, V kl]; (iii) firms adjust capital if V k > [V n, V l, V kl];
and (iv) firms adjust capital and labor if V kl > [V n, V l, V k]. Given these options, and
as it will become clear later in the numerical analysis, firms will follow an (S,s) policy
in both capital and labor.
The model presented cannot be solved analytically because of the nonconvex nature
of the decision rules. Therefore, a numerical solution is needed. In the next section I
explain the numerical procedure used to solve the model, analyze the decision rules, and
36The FOCs for the static optimization problem are conditional on λ and, under the full specification
of the model, given by:
h : µˆ(1− λj)z¯kθˆ(lh)µˆh−1eτmϕ − ζw1lhζ−1 = 0 (11)
e : τ(1− λj)z¯kθˆ(lh)µˆeτ−1mϕ = pe (12)
m : φ(1− λj)z¯kθˆ(lh)µˆeτmϕ−1 = pm (13)
∀(z¯, k, l); j = capital, labor, capital and labor (adjustment type), and λj = 0 if there is no adjustment.
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explore the qualitative implications emerging from this model.
4 Capital and Labor Adjustment Dynamics: A Nu-
merical Analysis
The primary purpose of this paper is to analyze how firms make dynamic joint decisions
about capital and employment. Given the evidence and the model presented above,
this section describes firms’ decision rules with respect to capital and employment ad-
justment and numerically analyzes whether these decision rules are able to generate
simulated economies that reproduce the facts observed in the data. First, I explain
the computational methods used to solve the model numerically. Second, I parametrize
the model with adjustment cost parameters that appear to be ex-ante reasonable, ana-
lyzing the decision rules that the model implies and presenting time series realizations
under several configurations of adjustment costs, in order to give an idea of the ergodic
distribution of the state variables and which decision rules the firms visit more often.
4.1 Numerical Methods
The equation to solve is the Bellman equation given in (2). The solution must give the
firms’ optimal choices for hours, energy, materials, investment, and employment given
the vector of shocks z, capital k, and previous employment level l−1. The optimal levels
of hours, energy, and materials are a function of the state space (z, k, l−1), and this
problem can be solved analytically for every period as a function of this state space
conditional on the disruption cost λj as shown in footnote (36). The variables left to
solve are capital and labor, for which a numerical procedure should be used given the
dynamic links and non convexities that they exhibit in the model.
In the solution of this equation, three basic choices must be made: (i) the procedure
for maximization over the state space, (ii) the procedure to solve the unknown value
function V (z, k, l−1) and (iii) the procedure to solve for the integral over the shocks that
represents firms’ expectations about the future value V (•).
For (i), I choose a small number of points for the state space (3 for the productivity
shock, 2 for the demand shock, 70 for the capital stock, and 30 for the number of workers)
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and use a golden section search method to determine the maximum over the entire state
space, bracketing first the optimal region and then using linear interpolation of the
optimal values to the values in the grid. For (ii) I use value function iteration, since the
existence of kinks in the value function did not ensure reliable results for the full range
of parameters using other methods like policy iteration or polynomial parametrization.
For (iii), I integrate using quadrature methods as in Tauchen and Hussey (1991). This
quadrature is solved with Hermite polynomials, which are the best for this situation
since the shocks are assumed (and estimated from the data) as AR(1) log-processes
with lognormal error terms. I assume independence of both shocks such that the shock
calibrated in the model is the result of the multiplication of those two. The code is
written in Matlab and C, linking the programs through MEX-files.
4.2 About the Parameters
There are two sets of parameters: those that can be directly estimated without imposing
an economic model (reduced-form parameters) and those that need to be calibrated or
estimated with some simulation procedure (structural parameters). In the first group
we have: the production function coefficients (i.e, the input factor elasticities) χ, α, ξ,
and ν for capital, labor, energy and materials respectively; the demand shock process
Xit; the technology shock process Ait; the elasticity of demand ψ; the depreciation rate
δ; the hours wage elasticity ζ; and the discount factor β. In the second group we have
the adjustment cost parameters: γj for the convex cost, Fj for the fixed cost, λj for the
disruption cost, and {pI , psell} for the price of capital. Because the data set does not
contain capital prices and although I can calculate the mean input prices from the data
in the case of employment, energy, and materials, I choose to calibrate them using the
theoretical model because of the lack of capital prices in order to put all the factor prices
on equal footing. The calibration based on the model come very close to the relative
prices calculated from the data for energy and materials. I cannot compare the wage
calibration with the data because hourly wages and capital prices are not available.
The estimates for production function coefficients, the demand and technology shock
processes, and the elasticity of demand are taken from Eslava et al. (2004).37 The
37They use information on prices to estimate an output-based KLEM production function with de-
mand shift instruments, taking advantage of Syverson (2005)’s insight that using demand as an instru-
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coefficients are 0.213 for capital, 0.303 for labor, 0.176 for materials and 0.275 for energy.
The demand elasticity is ψ = 2.28. With respect to other reduced-form parameters, I
assume that the demand shocks and the technology shocks follow an AR(1) lognormal
process such that (with lowercase letters meaning logs and dropping the subindex i)
at = ρaat−1 + ut and xt = ρxxt−1 + εt. These equations are estimated as in Eslava
et al. (2004) using year effects. The coefficients obtained are ρa = 0.922, ρx = 0.985,
σa = 0.77, and σx = 0.89. Given that σa
2 = σu
2
1−ρa2 and σx
2 = σ
2
ε
1−ρx2 , we get σu = 0.297
and σε = 0.151. I normalize the mean values of the shocks to 1 (affecting also the input
prices). The shocks can be seen as deviations from an aggregate trend in technological
progress and/or demand. The discount factor β is set as 0.95, the depreciation rate δ as
0.1, and the hours-wage elasticity as 1.1.
Prices for energy and materials are calculated by solving the FOCs of the problem
without adjustment costs.38 The values for capital, labor, energy, and materials plugged
into these equations are the means of the actual values. It is interesting to note that the
implied prices are very close to those obtained by dividing energy and materials expen-
ditures by physical amounts. The labor payment parameters w0 and w1 are obtained by
solving the system composed of the FOCs for hours and labor in the problem without
adjustment costs39 and again using mean values. The investment price is obtained by
solving the dynamic problem in the case of no uncertainty and no adjustment costs.40
With respect to the structural parameters, they are estimated in section 5. However,
ment for input factors in production function estimation can get rid of the endogeneity problems that
are well known in such situations. They implement this idea creating downstream demand shift in-
struments selected with Shea (1997)’s relevance and exogeneity criteria, in order to find the production
function coefficients and the technology shock process. An advantage of their methodology is that the
price information allows them to isolate a firm-specific price deflator, so that TFP estimations do not use
a common price deflator that, as Klette and Griliches (1996) and Foster et al. (2005) illustrate, would
bias the estimates of the production function coefficients. Next, Eslava et al. (2004) take advantage of
the price information and estimate a downward sloping demand curve similar to the one assumed here,
instrumenting output using the calculated TFP and getting the demand shocks as the residuals of this
demand regression
38That is, equations (12) and (13) respectively without the (1− λj) term. Even though those prices
can be an important source of fluctuations and relative changes in input adjustment, this paper focuses
on the firms’ responses to demand and productivity shocks. This is the reason to look for an “average”
input price in each case and guides the calculation of the prices.
39Equation (11) without the (1 − λj) term in the case of hours and µz¯kθˆlµˆ−1eτmϕ = w0 + w1hζ in
the case of labor.
40The implicit assumption for the calculation of the prices is that the frictionless FOCs hold “on
average.”
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in order to numerically analyze the decision rules generated by the model, I chose for
the moment in this section the adjustment cost parameters in an arbitrary manner such
that the adjustment costs are the same for all types of costs and collectively account
for either 4% or 20% of average profit. From this point on, I focus on the congestion
effect because it is the one that is later supported by the data. Table 5 shows the chosen
parameters for the adjustment costs and the average adjustment cost as a proportion of
the contemporaneous profit. These costs do not increase proportionally from one column
to the next because they were obtained with simulations and reflect an approximate
rather than exact value. Finally, in this section I take the capital resale price equal to
70% of the price of buying capital (partially reversible investment).
4.3 Decision Rules for Capital and Employment Adjustment
I now present the numerical results for the decision rules (or invariant policy functions)
and their implications for firm behavior, given by the chosen initial parametrization for
the adjustment costs. Before I start analyzing the numerical results, it is important to
clarify the firms’ decision problem. There are three states defining the situation of a
firm: an idiosyncratic deviation from an aggregate level of demand or technology (i.e., a
shock), a capital level, and an employment level. If a firm found itself in another state
of demand or technology in the next period (i.e., because of a higher seasonal demand
level or a change in management, that results in a demand or a technology shock), then
the firm has the option of not adjusting any factor, adjusting only capital, adjusting
only employment, or adjusting both capital and employment. The policy rules solve
the question: if the firm is hit by a shock z, what is the optimal decision for the next
period’s capital and labor given the current period’s capital and labor?
The decision rules are presented in a graphical analysis over the space determined by
the values of capital (y-axis) and labor(x-axis) for each value of the shock. In this context,
a shock represents a combination of a demand and a productivity shock, discretized in
2 and 3 states respectively (6 shocks total).41 As expected, there is a region of inaction
whose size depends on the value of the shocks, the type of adjustment costs, and the
41Specifically, shock 1 in the figures represents low demand and low productivity; shock 2 represents
low demand and average productivity; shock 3 represents low demand and high productivity; shock
4 represent high demand low productivity; shock 5 represents high demand and average productivity;
and shock 6 represents high demand and high productivity
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existence or not of congestion effects in adjustment. This region of inaction determines
a bidimensional (S,s) policy in capital and labor depending not only on the shocks and
the other state variables but also on the other choice variables. However, some regions
are more likely to affect firm behavior than others since the ergodic distribution of the
state space is an important point to take into account. To better illustrate this point,
it would be optimal to plot the probability distribution over each adjustment/inaction
region to know how likely is that a firm will find itself in that specific region. However,
such a plot is graphically confusing; instead I present several time series realizations of
firms’ behavior under different configurations of adjustment costs.
Figure 2 shows the policy functions for the case where all costs are present for capital
and labor (and equal to 4%) and there are congestion effects in adjustment. The first
thing to note is that there is an inaction region whose shape and size depend on the
shock and the value of both factors. This inaction region defines a bidimensional (S,s)
policy for capital and labor. The optimal (S,s) policy depends on the shock and the
choice of the other variable (either capital or labor).
Even though some adjustment regions for capital and labor are not convex sets, there
are defined zones in which it is optimal to adjust only labor and others in which it is
optimal to adjust only capital, especially for low demand shocks (i.e, shocks 1 to 3;
see figure 2). In some of the policy rules there exist disjoint sets in the capital-labor
(kl) space for a given shock. For example, for the same capital to labor ratio there
may exist inaction or adjustment depending on the level of capital and labor, opening
the possibility of multiple optimal regimes. According to the optimal rule, firms adjust
capital and labor together only if the firm has a high demand shock (in this case, shocks
4 to 6). This implies that there is an implicit target for a relationship between capital
and labor, and that target changes with the nature and size of the shock.
With just one factor, a standard (S,s) rule would hold, with the shock being the only
determinant of the optimal adjustment policy. With the possibility of adjusting capital
and labor, firms make decisions depending on where they are with respect to the optimal
target of not just one isolated factor but a composite of capital and labor. This result is
similar to that of Eslava et al. (2005), when implementing the gap approach by Caballero
et al. (1995, 1997); their empirical results in these two studies suggest that firms adjust
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labor and capital depending on the gap between desired and actual employment and
labor. The structural analysis here implies that this gap is implicitly affected by the gap
in the other factor, resulting in the bivariate (S,s) policy.
Figures 3, 4 and 5 compare the decision rules implied by the different types of ad-
justment costs considered one by one in the presence (or absence) of congestion effects
in the case of a bad shock (low demand and low productivity shocks), an intermediate
shock (high demand and low productivity shocks) and a good shock (high demand and
high productivity shocks). With respect to the adjustment cost types, the convex cost
implies a larger region of adjustment in both capital and employment than either the
fixed cost and the disruption cost. It is important to note, as the theoretical analysis
of the model revealed above, that even with convex costs there is a region of inaction,
though much smaller than the one present under nonconvex costs. The biggest inac-
tion zone corresponds to the disruption cost. The fixed cost implies more staggered
adjustment than the disruption cost, under which simultaneous adjustment of both fac-
tors is more frequent. The behavior implied by the disruption cost looks more in line
with the empirical evidence, which shows a positive comovement between capital and
employment.
For low values of the shock (i.e., low demand and low productivity shocks) as shown
in figure 3, the behavior under convex or disruption costs does not depend much on the
existence of congestion effects, and the only difference between the behavior under convex
costs and under disruption costs is the adjustment of only labor in a small region under
convex costs. For the low shock case, fixed costs generate a more differentiated behavior,
as there is no joint adjustment of capital and employment in the case of congestion effects.
In the intermediate shock case (i.e., high demand and low productivity shocks) as shown
in figure 4, we observe that without congestion effects, there is more joint adjustment
of capital and employment. This does not necessarily imply a higher correlation of
adjustments under this regime, however, because capital and labor can move in opposite
directions. The inaction zones are defined as double (S,s) bands. Interestingly, there
is more joint adjustment in the convex cost case with congestion effects than without
them. The pattern for fixed costs observed in the low shock case repeats itself here: joint
adjustment is rare in the presence of congestion effects. If firms face a high shock (i.e.,
25
high demand and high productivity shocks) as shown in figure 5, there is much more
joint adjustment and the behavior under convex and disruption costs is very similar,
with a larger inaction zone in the disruption case as expected. Again, fixed costs present
the most different pattern: in the presence of congestion effects, firms will adjust only
labor under certain circumstances.
The decision rules as presented above do not say anything about the direction or size
of the adjustments. For example, capital and labor can move at the same time but in
different directions. There exist enormous nonlinearities in the decision rules. Figures
6 and 7 show the decision rules for labor adjustment and investment for several values
for capital and labor and in the case of an intermediate shock (i.e., high demand and
low productivity shocks) with low adjustment costs. From Figure 6, we observe that
at low values of capital and labor the adjustments are in the same direction (positive),
but for higher values, firms stagger depending on the state of (k, l); that is, under some
combinations of capital and labor, firms reduce capital and do not adjust labor, and
under other values they do the opposite. Figure 7 shows that factors can adjust in
opposite directions when a firm has high values of capital and low values of employment
or vice versa (higher or lower relative to their frictionless optimum). This means that at
low values for both capital and labor the correlation between their adjustments is likely
to be positive, while at higher values this correlation is likely to be negative.
Thus we have different possibilities of firm behavior depending on whether firms
face good or bad shocks, whether they face congestion effects in the adjustment and
depending on the type of dominant adjustment cost. In summary, the main features of
these decision rules are as follows:
(i) The decision rules for capital and employment adjustment exhibit a nonlinear
pattern with inaction zones, zones of joint adjustment, and zones of single factor ad-
justment. That is, the decision rules present a non linear (S,s) rule in both capital and
labor. Adjustment or inaction in capital and labor depend not only on the states, such
as the productivity and demand shocks and the capital to labor ratio, but also on the
choices of capital and labor.
(ii) Persistent bad shocks (low demand and low productivity shocks) and fixed costs
lead to a less frequent joint adjustment in capital and employment. Persistent good
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shocks (high demand and high productivity shocks) increase the joint employment and
capital adjustment.
(iii) In general, the presence of convex costs tends to increase the likelihood of joint
adjustment for capital and labor while the presence of fixed costs tends to reduce it.
Disruption costs can accommodate a richer type of adjustment, depending on a firm’s
capital to labor ratio. This does not translate directly into measures of correlation since
the adjustment of capital and labor can occur in opposite directions.
(iv) Under intermediate shocks (high demand and low productivity shocks) or high
shocks (high demand and high productivity shocks), congestion effects in the adjustment
increase the likelihood of joint adjustment. Under low shocks (low demand and low
productivity shocks), this is true only if fixed costs are dominant.
(v) Inaction regions are present with all types of costs, but larger when firms face
disruption or fixed costs. However, in the case of fixed costs, inaction zones can present
disjoint sets, which open the possibility for multiple optimal regimes of capital and
labor for the same capital to labor ratio. Inaction zones are more important in the case
of intermediate shocks, being almost nonexistent for bad shocks and smaller for good
shocks.
(vi) Congestion effects increase the inaction in both capital and labor adjustments in
all the cases. When congestion effects are not present, fixed costs increase inaction and
volatility in both capital and labor with respect to the convex and disruption cases; when
congestion effects are present, convex costs increase the volatility of the investment rate
and decrease the volatility in labor growth compared with the case when either fixed or
disruption costs are present. However, when congestion effects are present and firms face
all types of adjustment costs, the volatility of labor growth increases and the volatility
of the investment rate decreases.
(vii) The decision rules presented show a model that can accommodate at the same
time smooth, lumpy, and infrequent adjustment, depending on the value of the shocks,
the level of capital and labor, the type of adjustment costs, and the presence or not of
congestion effects.
Other important implications of different configurations of the adjustment costs can
be seen by plotting the time series realizations that the policy rules imply as a way of
visualizing the regions where the firms spend more time. For example, we could try
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to find out whether bigger inaction regions imply less variability of investment or are
compensated by larger adjustments. Figure 8 shows the time series realization of one
shock series when a firm faces all types of adjustment costs comparing the effects of
congestion vs. no congestion , figure 9 shows the labor growth when the firm faces
different types of adjustment costs with and without congestion effects, and figure 10
shows the investment responses of the same.
These time series realizations show that the presence of congestion effects increases
the inaction in both capital and labor adjustments in all the cases. On the other hand,
fixed costs and disruption costs have the same effect on investment rates when there
are congestion effects, even if the decision rules are different. When congestion effects
are not present, fixed costs increase inaction and volatility in both capital and labor
with respect to the convex and disruption cases. When congestion effects are present
and firms face all types of adjustment costs, the volatility of labor growth increases and
the volatility of the investment rate decreases. Also when congestion effects are present,
convex costs increase the volatility of the investment rate and decrease the volatility in
labor growth compared with the cases when either fixed or disruption costs are present.
5 Adjustment Cost Parameters: Estimation
In this section, I use a minimum distance algorithm to find the adjustment cost pa-
rameters that allow me to match the moments from the data to the moments from a
simulated panel generated with the model. The main assumption is that the model is a
good approximation of the way firms make decisions about labor and capital.
The methodology to apply is the method of simulated moments, in the spirit of
McFadden (1989) and Hall and Rust (2003), among others. The choice of this estimation
method is made for computational feasibility. The parameter set to be estimated is
composed of fixed, convex, and disruption costs for capital, labor, and joint capital-
labor adjustment, and the resale price of capital. These are represented by a vector
Θ = [(Fk, Fl, Fkl), (γk, γl, γkl), (λk, λl, λkl), pi].
The algorithm consists of solving the dynamic programming problem (DPP) given a
set of parameters Θ, getting the policy functions for that specific parametrization, simu-
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lating a panel of plants, calculating the chosen moments from that panel and comparing
them with the moments from the data. The function that depends on the parameters and
must be minimized is given by: minΘ J(Θ) = {Mdata −Msimulated (Θ)}′W {Mdata −Msimulated (Θ)},
whereM is a vector of moments,W is a weighting matrix and Θ is a vector of parameters
to be estimated.
To find standard errors, there are two options. The first is to conduct a Monte Carlo
simulation, repeating the procedure under different realizations of the stochastic shock.
The second is by obtaining the asymptotic distribution of the estimator, as in Hall and
Rust (2003); this method (used in this paper) is simpler and much faster. I construct
the simulated panels with 1000 firms over 500 periods.42 To solve for parameters I use
the Nelder-Mead simplex algorithm.
Regarding the moments to match, the main questions are which moments reflect
variation in the parameters and which are worth matching given their relevance in un-
derstanding firm behavior. The empirical evidence in the second section presented char-
acteristic distributions for capital and labor. In particular, the distributions showed
highly irreversible capital and lumpy adjustment and inaction zones for both capital
and labor. However, given the arbitrary definition of inaction and the implications for
different types of capital,43 I choose not to match this feature. Instead, I focus on the
lumpiness of the distributions and match the adjustments above the 90th and below the
10th percentiles in the distribution of capital and labor adjustment (i.e., the fraction
of positive and negative spikes). The VAR(1) illustrates the dynamic interrelations of
capital and labor and is an important feature to consider. On the other hand, the model
highlights the importance of shocks in the movements of capital and labor; the correla-
tion between adjustments and shocks is therefore the other important moment. Finally,
the correlation between capital and labor adjustment is of prime interest in this paper
and completes the set of moments I attempt to match.
42At the moment, I set W to the identity matrix in order to estimate the parameters, which gives
consistent but not efficient estimates; however, in a second stage, I recalculate W as in Hall and Rust
(2003) in order to calculate the standard errors. In future work, I plan to reestimate the parameters
with this optimal weighting matrix to get efficient estimates. See Hall and Rust (2003) for more details.
43For example, a hammer, some special cutting tools, and a milling machine are capital goods, and
defining an investment rate lower than 1% as inaction would not account for the investment in small
but important units of capital.
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5.1 Adjustment Cost Parameters: Fitting the Data
In order to analyze whether congestion effects in the adjustment for capital and labor
are important, I first match the moments assuming that all parameters are present,
including the congestion effect parameters (Fkl, γkl, λkl), and compare the results with
those obtained not including the congestion effect terms. In order to analyze which
adjustment costs are important, I compare the results of the full specification model with
the results of models that shut down a particular type of adjustment cost. The calculated
moments are presented in table 6, and table 7 presents the calculated parameters with
the standard errors for the full specification.
Two important facts emerge from table 6:44 First, the model that considers congestion
effects does better in several dimensions than the model that does not. In particular,
one of the fitted VAR coefficients in the case without congestion effects has the wrong
sign relative to the data, and the contemporaneous correlation between capital and
employment adjustment is too high in the case without congestion effects. This suggests
that when firms adjust both factors they pay a price instead of benefiting from adjusting
them together. It is important to emphasize that even if the firms pay an extra cost
of adjusting capital and labor together, the discounted expected net benefit can still be
higher than if firms adjust one factor each period. The second important fact from table
6 is that the model that considers convex costs as the only cost faced by firms when
adjusting does the worse job in explaining the data moments.
Table 7 has important information about the size of the adjustment costs and about
the statistical significance of the estimates. With respect to the size of the estimates,
the high degree of irreversibility of capital in Colombia is observed in the lower selling
price of capital for all the models except in the benchmark convex case (by assumption
psell = pbuy in this case). This irreversibility is much bigger than the one found by Cooper
and Haltiwanger (2005) for the U.S. This degree of irreversibility is consistent with the
asymmetric distribution for the gross investment observed in the Colombian census. The
high costs of adjusting both factors at the same time are somewhat surprising. However,
the functional form for the congestion effects case does not allow for a direct comparison
44As in any nonlinear numerical optimization these results should be taken with care, because the
minimization routine is susceptible to getting local minima as solutions.
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between the individual costs and the congestion cost. The adjustment costs are not
large, but ignoring them does not allow a good match of the moments in the data.
With respect to the statistical significance of the estimates, the procedure makes it
possible to accept statistically the disruption costs for capital and labor, the convex
costs for capital but not for labor, and the congestion effect present in the convex and
disruption cost joint parameters. The low statistical significance of the fixed costs may
be due to the fact that the disruption cost absorbs all its effects. Also, I cannot reject the
possibility that the convex costs are present in the Colombian firms when they adjust
capital or capital and labor at the same time due to the statistical significance.
5.2 Nonformal Tests of Goodness of Fit
After determining the parameters, the following exercises look to determine how well the
model can fit the distributions of adjustment and other moments not considered in the
estimation procedure. Figure 11 replicates the distributions of adjustments generated
using the model and the estimated parameters. The simulated distributions are lumpier,
but the main characteristics observed in the data are present here. In particular, the
continuous adjustment in materials and energy contrasts with the lumpy pattern ob-
served in the distributions of adjustments of capital and labor. It is interesting to notice
how the model mimics the asymmetry in the capital adjustment distribution and the
symmetry in the labor adjustment distribution observed in the data.
Table 8 tries to replicate the logit estimates for the probability of spikes in adjustment
or inaction given such spikes in the other factor. In order to do so, I generated a panel
with 1000 firms and 500 periods using the estimated parameters, dropping the first
twenty observations in each simulated series. The logit estimated using the simulated
panel does a mixed job matching the empirical coefficients, but note that the definition
of small or large adjustment is arbitrary and given the lumpier nature of the simulated
panel these definitions can affect the results. In particular, there is a significant and
negative probability of adjusting capital and labor when there is inaction in the other
factor, which is not observed in the data.
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6 Conclusions
In this paper I have used the Colombian Annual Census of Manufacturing to analyze the
interrelationship of labor and capital adjustments, whether there are congestion effects
in the adjustment process, and the nature of the adjustment costs.
Empirically, firms adjust employment and capital in an interrelated way, using several
margins of adjustment in the process. As is the case for U.S. firms, there is a distribution
of adjustment that is lumpy and infrequent for capital and labor, and more frequent in
the case of materials and energy. These patterns suggest that to understand the effect of
policies such as tax investment incentives or reductions in firing/hiring costs, a model of
joint capital and labor adjustment is needed. I argue that these patterns can be explained
with a dynamic model in which labor and capital are costly to adjust. The adjustment
cost structure is chosen to match key facts observed in the data, such as the decrease
in output after adjustment, the cost of hiring and firing workers, the cost of installing
capital, a convex component to capture the mix of smooth and lumpy adjustment, and
an interaction term in the adjustment cost.
The firms’ decision rules implied by the proposed model show highly nonlinear ad-
justment patterns that can be characterized as a bidimensional (S,s) policy, where ad-
justment depends not just on the states of the system but also on the choices, meaning
that the firms decide to adjust either capital or labor or both depending of the shocks
and the initial capital to labor ratio. I estimate the parameters of the model using a
minimum distance algorithm. This method reveals that a model incorporating conges-
tion effects fits the data best. Also, based on the estimation procedure, I am able to
statistically reject the existence of fixed costs and to accept the existence of disruption
costs for capital and labor, the existence of convex costs for capital but not for labor,
and the existence of congestion effects.
The main conclusion is that labor and capital adjustment should be analyzed together.
This is supported both by theory and by the facts. The data show an interrelated
adjustment pattern. Moreover, a model that incorporates adjustments for both capital
and labor generates sharply different predictions if adjustment costs are assumed for one
factor alone. The main advantage of the methodology proposed in this paper is that
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several policy experiments can be analyzed. The effects of taxes and related policies on
capital and employment and the aggregate effects of these policies are among the main
ones. Finally, it may be worth exploring sectoral differences in firm behavior, especially
as the parameters and functional forms may not be the same for all types of industries.
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Table 1: Distribution of Factor Adjustment (%)
I
K
∆L
L
∆m
m
∆e
e
Inaction (abs(y) < 1%) 18.9 13.4 3.2 5.6
Positive Spike (y > 20%) 29.8 11.6 28.4 23.7
Negative Spike (y < 20%) 1.8 11.1 18.8 15.8
ρ(y, y−1) 0.025 -0.057 0.0 -0.298
Number of Observations 24,467 34,243 31,977 34,597
Table 2: Factor Adjustment Contemporaneous Correlation
I
K
∆L
L
∆m
m
∆e
e
I
K
1
∆L
L
0.057 1
∆m
m
0.026 0.175 1
∆e
e
0.041 0.107 0.147 1
All correlations are statistically
different from zero at 1% significance.
Table 3: Probability of Inaction/Adjustment Conditional on Inaction/Adjustment of
the Other Factor
Investment Employment Growth
Variable x P(Inaction/x) P(Spike/x) P(Inaction/x) P(Spike/x)
0.057 0.012Inaction
(0.071) (0.061)Investment
-0.11† 0.205**Spike
(-0.06) (0.048)
0.143* -0.033
Employment
Inaction
(0.067) (-0.058)
Growth -0.033 0.208**Spike
(-0.059) (0.046)
Observations 12,864 17,055 12,410 14,459
†/*/** significant at 10%, 5%, and 1%. TFP, demand shocks, and year effects in regression.
Dummies for inaction are defined as 1 if abs(x) < 0.01 and dummies for spikes are defined as 1 if
x > 0.2.
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Table 4: Dynamic Relations in Factor Adjustment
I
K
∆L
L
∆m
m
∆e
e
-0.008 -0.008 0.023 -0.038( IK )−1 0.006 (0.003)** (0.004)** (0.006)**
0.037 -0.147 0.049 0.091(∆LL )−1 (0.017)* (0.007)** (0.012)** (0.017)**
-0.007 0.024 -0.247 0.036(∆mm )−1 0.01 (0.004)** (0.007)** (0.010)**
0.013 0.009 0.006 -0.345(∆ee )−1 -0.007 (0.003)** (0.005)* (0.007)**
Observations 17,653 17,653 17,653 17,653
R-squared 0.03 0.07 0.26 0.23
Standard errors in parentheses; **/* significant at 1% / 5%;
year effects and shocks in regression.
Table 5: Parameter Adjustment Costs
Adjustment Cost Cost/ΠAdjusted Factor
Type 4% 20%
Fixed (Fl) 0.22 1
Labor Convex (γl) 0.05 0.15
Disrupt (λl) 0.01 0.035
Fixed (Fk) 0.01 0.044
Capital Convex (γk) 0.0007 0.006
Disrupt (λk) 0.01 0.045
Interaction Effects: Congestion/Π =30%
Joint Fixed (Fkl) 5 5
Adjustment Convex (γkl) 0.11 0.11
(Congestion) Disrupt (λkl) 0.07 0.07
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Table 6: Simulated Moments
Simulated Moments
Moments Data Convex+Fixed+Disruption Convex
Complem. No complem.
Positive Spikes 0.61 <(I/K) 0.1 0.181 0.3 0.38
(90th percentile) 0.23 < (∆ L/L) 0.1 0.133 0.27 0.25
Negative Spikes 0 >(I/K) 0.1 0.152 0.21 0.26
(10th percentile) -0.22 > (∆ L/L) 0.1 0.105 0.19 0.21
bkk -0.008 -0.009 -0.014 -0.003
bkl -0.008 -0.016 0.21 0.065VAR Coefficients
blk 0.037 0.068 0.045 0.005
bll -0.147 -0.203 -0.073 -0.866
ρ( IK ,
∆L
L )
0.057 0.049 0.139 0.203
Correlations ρ( IK ,z) 0.1 0.089 0.03 0.074
ρ(∆LL ,z)
0.05 0.135 0.154 0.297
J(θ) NA 0.022 0.152 0.745
NA = not applicable.
Table 7: Calculated Adjustment Cost Parameters
Convex+Fixed+Disruption Convex
Congestion Effects No Congestion Effects
Psell 0.42*pi (0.7307) 0.57*pi pi
Fk 0.0002 (0.0021014) 0.0065 NA
Fl 0.007 (0.090392) 0.013 NA
Fkl 0.14 (0.40376) NA NA
γk 0.000006 (0.0000004)** 0.000016 0.092
γl 0.0009 (0.0045079) 0.0000571 0.0134
γkl 0.016 (0.0065368)* NA 0.024
λk 0.0002 (0.0000182)** 0.00065 NA
λl 0.0215 (0.0043362)** 0.092 NA
λkl 0.046 (0.0199720)* NA NA
Standard errors in parentheses; **/* significant at 1% and 5%.
NA = not applicable.
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Table 8: Probability of Inaction/Adjustment Conditional on Inaction/Adjustment of
the Other Factor: Simulated Data
Investment Employment Growth
Variable x P(Inaction/x) P(Spike/x) P(Inaction/x) P(Spike/x)
0.026 ** -0.021**Inaction
(0.007) (0.007)Investment
-0.017* -0.001Spike
(-0.008) (-0.008)
0.031** -0.035**
Employment
Inaction
(0.008) (0.008)
Growth -0.003 -0.008Spike
(-0.008) (0.008)
Observations 49,000 49,000 49,000 49,000
†/*/** significant at 10%, 5% and 1%. TFP and demand shocks in regression
Dummies for inaction are defined as 1 if abs(x) < 0.01 and dummies for spikes are defined as 1 if
x > 0.2
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Figure 1. Distributions of Factor Adjustment. 
Percentage of Observations (y-axis) in a Range of Adjustment (x-axis)
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Figure 2. Decision Rules: All Costs in Capital and Labor.
Shock 1 to 3: low demand shock with low, average and high productivity respectively. 
Shock 4 to 6: high demand shock with low, average and high productivity respectively
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Figure 3. Decision Rules: Comparison Among Adjustment Costs, Low Shock
(Low Demand Shock with Low Productivity Shock)
4
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Figure 4. Decision Rules: Comparison Among Adjustment Costs, Intermediate Shock
(High Demand Shock with Low Productivity Shock)
4
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Figure 5. Decision Rules: Comparison Among Adjustment Costs, High Shock
(High Demand Shock with High Productivity Shock)
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Figure 6. Labor and Capital Adjustment Levels.
Intermediate Shock, (High Demand Shock with Low Productivity Shock).
Decision Rules at the Extreme Values for Capital and Labor, Both High or Both Low
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Figure 7. Labor and Capital Adjustment Levels.
Intermediate Shock, (High Demand Shock with Low Productivity Shock).
Decision Rules at the Extreme Values, Mix of High and Low values for Capital and Labor
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Figure 8. Time Series. All Costs Present
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Figure 9. Time Series. Investment Rate, Adjustment Costs Comparison
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Figure 10. Time Series. Labor Growth, Adjustment Costs Comparison
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Figure 11. Distributions of Factor Adjustments for the Simulated Series. 
Percentage of Observations (y-axis) in a Range of Adjustment (x-axis)
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